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PATENTS, HIDDEN NOVELTY, AND FOOD SAFETY 
Jeanette M. Roorda* 
Abstract 
This Note discusses how federal agency policy results in a lack of 
access to patent-protected genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for 
independent food safety testing. The U.S. GMO policy is a combination 
of biotechnology regulations and biotechnology intellectual property 
protections. Intellectual property protection for the developers of new 
organisms has increased as the technology has advanced from manual 
pollination to genetic modification methods. Initially the only protection 
available was in the form of trade secrets, but the protection has increased 
incrementally to now include full utility patent protection. This Note 
evaluates the interactions between U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) GMO policy and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) GMO 
policy by comparing USPTO and FDA treatment of various human 
consumption products. GMO food products fall into a narrow “hidden 
novelty” exception created by the combination of the FDA’s GMO policy 
and the GMO manufacturers’ use of licensing enabled by utility patent 
protection. This Note emphasizes the necessity of access to human 
consumption products for independent safety testing and illustrates this 
necessity through a comparison to trans fats. Finally, this Note proposes 
a narrow research exemption to correct the “hidden novelty” exception 
while leaving patent law precedent undisturbed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are a growing part of the 
U.S. food supply. Biotechnology is rapidly advancing and potentially 
solving the many challenges of feeding the world’s growing population. 
The United States embraces innovation by allowing Congress “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”1 Fantastic new 
discoveries come with many unknowns, and uncertainty is inherent in 
scientific discoveries. GMOs are no exception; they come with many 
potential benefits as well as many potential concerns. 
One way Congress fulfills the constitutional mandate “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts” is by issuing utility patents 
to secure “for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2 A utility patent is intended 
to grant the owner “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States” 
for the term of the patent.3 In exchange for the inventor’s limited 
monopoly, the public receives the benefit of the invention itself and the 
knowledge gained through the invention.  
GMOs have the potential to provide great benefits to the public. The 
potential benefits of GMOs include a more nutritious and abundant food 
supply for not only the United States but also the world.4 Genetic 
                                                                                                                     
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). 
 4. See JEFF SIMMONS, TECHNOLOGY’S ROLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: MAKING SAFE, 
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modifications to food organisms can result in faster growth rates, 
increased yields, improved nutrition content, pest resistance, weed 
resistance, disease resistance, and other beneficial characteristics.5 The 
development of such a potentially beneficial invention should be 
promoted, but at the same time, potential concerns must be adequately 
addressed. 
The concerns regarding GMOs are related to their possible impact on 
human health and the environment. In the United States, the majority of 
processed foods contain at least one GMO ingredient.6 Therefore, any 
adverse latent health effects from GMOs could have a widespread 
detrimental effect on the U.S. population. Additionally, because GMOs 
are living organisms, when a GMO is introduced into the environment, 
the genetically modified trait can spread into other related species through 
pollination or sexual reproduction.7 Once a genetic modification has 
spread, it could be difficult or impossible to remove. While the risk of 
these concerns may be low, the severity of the potential impact warrants 
adequate research. 
Many scholars have explored the various concerns surrounding 
GMOs. For example, Professor Mary Jane Angelo has analyzed the U.S. 
regulatory framework for GMOs.8 Professors Lars Noah9 and Katharine 
Van Tassel10 have provided contrasting views related to tort liability 
concerns for GMOs. The concept of IP overreach, identified by Professor 
Elizabeth Rowe, provided the inspiration for this Note.11  
This Note explores the U.S. regulatory framework for GMOs and the 
underlying policies for protecting the intellectual property of the 
developers of new organisms. It focuses on the interaction between U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) GMO policy and Food and Drug 
                                                                                                                     
AFFORDABLE AND ABUNDANT FOOD A GLOBAL REALITY 7 (2011), 
https://www.ncbiotech.org/sites/default/files/pages/Three-Rights-White-Paper-Revised.pdf. 
 5. Weighing the GMO Arguments: For, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/focus/2003/gmo7.htm (last visited June 25, 2016). 
 6. See Genetically Modified Foods, GENETIC SCI. LEARNING CTR. (June 22, 2014), 
http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/science/gmfoods/. 
 7. See R.L. Nielsen, Minimizing Pollen Drift & Commingling of GMO and Non-GMO 
Corn Grain, CHAT N’ CHEW CAFE (Mar. 2000), http://www.kingcorn.org/news/articles.00/GMO 
_Issues000307.html. 
 8. Mary Jane Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology Model for 
Regulating the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
93 (2007) (proposing a new evolutionary biology model for regulating GMOs). 
 9. Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm 
Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006) (warning against inappropriate legal 
action and overregulation of new technology). 
 10. Katharine Van Tassel, The Introduction of Biotech Foods to the Tort System: Creating 
a New Duty to Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1645 (2004). 
 11. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified Foods, and IP Overreaching, 64 
SMU L. REV. 859 (2011). 
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Administration (FDA) GMO policy. This Note identifies a “hidden 
novelty” exception and discusses how this exception allows 
manufacturers to use the protective power of a utility patent to create a 
monopoly on the safety research of GMOs in the U.S. food supply. 
Finally, it explores why access to GMOs for independent food safety 
testing is a necessity and suggests a solution. 
This Note presents its argument in four Parts. Part I explains the 
history of U.S. GMO policy, beginning with a description of the U.S. 
regulatory framework for biotechnology. Next, Part I explores the 
increasing levels of intellectual property protection available to the 
developers of new organisms. Part I provides the underlying logic that 
defines GMO policy. 
Part II discusses the interaction between USPTO GMO policy and 
FDA GMO policy. It defines the roles of the USPTO and the FDA as well 
as identifies the purpose and responsibilities of each agency for GMO 
food products. Additionally, Part II explores examples to compare and 
highlight the varying treatment of different food products by the USPTO 
and the FDA. 
Part III explains how independent researchers do not have access to 
GMOs for food safety testing as a result of the interaction of FDA policy 
and utility patent protection. Part III describes how the protective power 
of a utility patent and licensing restrictions shield from independent 
safety testing GMOs used as an ingredient or component of a processed 
food product, creating a narrow exception that this Note refers to as the 
special “hidden novelty” exception. The same protective power and 
licensing restrictions extend the monopoly of the manufacturer to include 
a monopoly on safety research of the patented GMO food product. 
Part IV asserts the necessity of access to GMOs for independent 
research. It explores lessons from the history of trans fat—another man-
made food product with many novel and useful characteristics—in the 
U.S. food supply. Part IV argues that patent policy should remain intact 
and that the FDA should enact regulations that create access to GMOs for 
independent research. This is the best solution to correct the special 
“hidden novelty” exception because it ensures that all food products in 
the U.S. food supply can be independently tested for safety without 
disturbing relevant patent law precedent.  
GMO manufacturers combine the power of patent license protection 
with FDA policy to create a lack of access to GMO food products for 
independent food safety testing.12 All other food products in the U.S. food 
supply are accessible for independent testing because they either lack 
patent protection, are sold rather than licensed, or can be easily identified 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop Research?, SCI. AM. (July 20, 2009), http:// 
www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-seed-companies-control-gm-crop-research/ [hereinafter 
Seed Companies]. 
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and isolated. Should a manufacturer be able to obtain utility patent 
protection, based on the novel and useful characteristics of a GMO that 
distinguish it from its non-modified counterpart, and then use the utility 
patent protection to prohibit any independent safety testing of the GMO 
as a food product?  
I.  THE HISTORY OF U.S. GMO POLICY 
Genetic modification of living organisms is a relatively new 
technological advancement. Congress has not passed any specialized 
legislation for GMOs.13 As a result, the existing general statutory 
framework regulates GMOs.14 Three federal agencies are responsible for 
the majority of GMO regulation issues: the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), the FDA, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).15 This Part provides a brief overview of how the 
regulatory responsibility for GMOs is spread across these federal 
agencies. It also describes the increasing levels of intellectual property 
protection that developers of new organisms have received. 
A.  Regulating Biotechnology 
In 1986, the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced “the 
policy of the federal agencies involved with the review of biotechnology 
research and products” in the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework).16 The Coordinated 
Framework integrates multiple agencies’ regulations to cover all forms 
of biotechnology.17 It details the federal regulatory policy intended to 
ensure the safety of biotechnology research and products.18 Rather than 
create policy specific to GMOs, Congress determined that the existing 
statutory frameworks provide “adequate [regulation] to ensure health and 
environmental safety while maintaining sufficient regulatory flexibility 
to avoid impeding the growth of an infant industry.”19 
Under the existing statutory framework, a product’s use determines 
which federal agency has jurisdiction over that product, including 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See LUIS ACOSTA, RESTRICTIONS ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: UNITED 
STATES, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php (last updated June 9, 2015). 
 14. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 
23,302–03 (June 26, 1986). 
 15. Id. at 23,303–06; ACOSTA, supra note 13; Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, 
Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and 
Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2216–17 (2004). 
 16. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302. 
 17. Id. at 23,302–03.  
 18. Id.; see also Mandel, supra note 15, at 2216 (outlining the intentions behind the federal 
regulatory policy). 
 19. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302–03. 
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GMOs.20 The FDA has jurisdiction over foods, food additives, human 
drugs, biologics and devices, and animal drugs.21 The USDA’s Food 
Safety Inspection Service has jurisdiction over domestic livestock and 
poultry.22 The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has 
jurisdiction over the shipment or release of animal biologics and plant 
pests.23 The EPA has jurisdiction over pesticides, including organisms 
genetically modified to produce their own pesticide.24 
The Coordinated Framework recognizes that as scientific knowledge 
and understanding of possible risks of biotechnology increases, 
modification to the regulatory framework may be necessary.25 The 
Coordinated Framework carefully notes that “there always can be 
potential problems and deficiencies in the regulatory apparatus in a fast 
moving field.”26 However, the Coordinated Framework has remained—
without modification—the regulatory framework for biotechnology 
products since its establishment in 1986.27 
The current statutory framework regulating GMOs is no longer 
adequate to ensure health and environmental safety. The current 
framework is deficient because it allows GMO manufacturers to use 
licensing restrictions to prevent access to GMO food products for 
independent food safety testing.28 Under the current framework, GMO 
manufacturers, who profit financially from the inclusion of GMOs in the 
U.S. food supply, have sole control of the safety testing of their 
products.29 This does not sufficiently ensure that the manufacturer’s 
financial profit concerns will not overshadow health and environmental 
safety concerns. Federal agency policy must address these shortcomings 
to reduce the potential risk of any health and environmental harms while 
ensuring the intellectual property rights of manufacturers are protected. 
B.  Protecting the Developers of New Food Plants 
A growing population requires a growing food supply. Throughout 
history, mankind has sought better ways to produce food. As the history 
of agricultural advancements demonstrates, the level of intellectual 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See id. at 23,303; Mandel, supra note 15, at 2216–17. 
 21. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,304. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 23,304–05. 
 25. Id. at 23,302, 23,306. 
 26. Id. at 23,306. 
 27. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,989–90 (May 29, 1992); Food from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/GEPlants/default.htm (last updated 
Nov. 19, 2015). 
 28. See Seed Companies, supra note 12.  
 29. Id.  
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property protection has increased as more technology is employed with 
advancements.30 The purpose of providing intellectual property 
protection to plants is to encourage the development of novel varieties 
with the end result of promoting agriculture in the public interest.31 
However, another purpose emerged when the USPTO introduced utility 
patents as intellectual property protection for GMOs. GMO 
manufacturers are now combining licensing with FDA policy to maintain 
full control and oversight of any safety testing of GMO food products.32 
This new purpose of preventing independent safety research conflicts 
with the fundamental purpose of promoting agriculture in the public 
interest. An overview of the history of intellectual property protection 
given to plants highlights the fundamental connection of intellectual 
property protection to the promotion of agriculture in the public interest. 
1.  Trade Secrets 
The first advances in seed development were made through manual 
pollination.33 In manual pollination, the seed producer selects two parent 
plants from different plant lines and cross-pollinates the parent plants.34 
The goal of manual pollination is to develop a plant with a combination 
of desired characteristics not exhibited in either of the parent plant lines.35 
The seed developed through this process is called a hybrid seed.36 
Typically, hybrid seeds only produce plants with the desired 
characteristics in the first generation of seed.37 Subsequent generations of 
seed resulting from open pollination develop “inconsistent and 
undesirable characteristics.”38 
The initial intellectual property protection for agricultural 
biotechnology came in the form of trade secret protection for hybrid 
seeds.39 The hybrid seeds have built-in protection for the seed producer.40 
Because hybrid seeds are only useful for the first generation, seed 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See Rowe, supra note 11, at 862. 
  31. See Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542, 1542 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2012)), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT (1974); 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 24.03 
(2014). 
 32. See Seed Companies, supra note 12.  
 33. Rowe, supra note 11, at 863. 
 34. Theresa Friday, Heirloom or hybrid tomatoes, which to choose?, UNIV. OF FLA. IFAS 
EXTENSION SANTA ROSA (Mar. 13, 2012), http://santarosa.ifas.ufl.edu/blog/2012/03/13/heirloom-
or-hybrid-tomatoes-which-to-choose/. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Rowe, supra note 11, at 863. See Friday, supra note 34. 
 39. Rowe, supra note 11, at 862. 
 40. Id. at 863. See Friday, supra note 34. 
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producers can sell the first generation hybrid seed and do not have to be 
concerned about losing market share through the use or sale of the 
subsequent generations of seed produced by the buyer.41 The seed 
producer can continue to profit each year with the sale of the first 
generation hybrid seeds by keeping the parent lines as a trade secret and 
only selling the first-generation hybrid seeds.42 Independent parties are 
simply unable to reproduce a plant with the same characteristics using 
subsequent generations of the seed. 
2.  Plant Patent Act of 1930 
The first patent protection for plants came when Congress passed the 
Townsend–Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA).43 The intent behind 
the PPA was “to afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same 
opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been 
given industry.”44 The USPTO administers plant patents for those plants 
that meet the PPA’s specifications.45 The PPA provides protection solely 
for plants asexually reproduced that also meet the general patent 
eligibility requirements of novelty, originality, and nonobviousness.46 
The asexual reproduction requirement means the plant must be 
reproduced by means such as cuttings or grafting and not by seeds.47 
A plant patent is only infringed when others asexually reproduce the 
plant.48 Therefore, the use of seeds to sexually reproduce a plant protected 
under the PPA does not constitute infringement.49 Additionally, another 
plant producer is free to independently breed a similar variety.50 Nothing 
restricts independent parties from growing or conducting research on any 
seeds produced by the plants; they are simply prohibited from asexually 
reproducing the plant. Thus, protection under the PPA is typically only 
beneficial for a plant variety that can only be reproduced asexually or is 
very difficult to reproduce sexually.51 The purpose of intellectual 
property protection under the PPA is to encourage the preservation of a 
unique plant with desirable characteristics by providing a financial 
incentive to individuals who undertake the effort to preserve and 
asexually propagate a plant that would otherwise cease to exist when the 
parent plant died. 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Rowe, supra note 11, at 863. See Friday, supra note 34. 
 42. See Rowe, supra note 11, at 863. 
 43. Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930); CHISUM, supra note 31, § 24.02(1). 
 44. CHISUM, supra note 31, § 24.02(1) (quoting S. REP. NO. 71-315 (1930)). 
 45. Id. § 24.01. 
 46. Id. § 24.02(2). 
 47. Id. § 24.02(2)(b). 
 48. Id. § 24.01. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 24.02. 
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3.  Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 
Sexually reproduced plants did not receive any additional protection 
until Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA).52 
The PVPA provides protection for plants whose seeds produced heritable 
traits that are consistent and desirable through not only the first 
generation of seed but also in subsequent generations of seed.53 The 
purpose of the PVPA is “[t]o encourage the development of novel 
varieties of sexually reproduced plants and to make them available to the 
public, providing protection available to those who breed, develop, or 
discover them, and thereby promoting progress in agriculture in the 
public interest.”54 A developer of a novel variety of plant who acquires a 
certificate of protection under the PVPA has the exclusive right for the 
patent term to “exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for 
sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it in 
producing . . . a hybrid or different variety therefrom.”55 
Although the PVPA provides protection similar to patent protection, 
the protection is distinctly different in two critical aspects.56 First, the 
PVPA authorizes the USDA to issue certificates of plant variety 
protection (PVP certificates) rather than authorizing the USPTO to issue 
a patent.57 Second, the PVPA provides exemptions for activities that 
could otherwise constitute infringement under a patent.58 Two important 
exemptions are the research exemption and the crop exemption.59 The 
research exemption states that “[t]he use and reproduction of a protected 
variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute 
an infringement of the protection provided under this chapter.”60 The crop 
exemption originally allowed farmers to save seed for replanting their 
own crops and to sell limited quantities of saved seed to others for 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542, 1542 (1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 2321–2583). 
 53. 7 U.S.C. § 2541 (2012). 
 54. 84 Stat. at 1542. 
 55. 7 U.S.C. § 2483. 
 56. An interesting third distinct difference is beyond the scope of this Note. The PVPA 
allows a protected variety to be “open to use on a basis of equitable remuneration to the owner, 
not less than a reasonable royalty" if necessary "to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or 
feed in this country.” Id. § 2404. This provision protects the U.S. food supply by allowing the 
USDA to force the owner of a protected plant variety to allow the use of the protected variety at 
a reasonable price to ensure an adequate supply of food is available. See CHISUM, supra note 31, 
§ 24.03(4)(a)(i). 
 57. 7 U.S.C. § 2323. 
 58. Id. §§ 2542–2545. 
 59. Id. § 2543 (Crop Exemption); id. § 2544 (Research Exemption).  See Rowe, supra note 
11, at 864–65. 
 60. 7 U.S.C. § 2544. 
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replanting.61 However, in 1994, Congress amended the PVPA to 
eliminate the ability of farmers to sell saved seed to others for replanting, 
but it “[c]ontinues to allow farmers to save seed for replanting on their 
own farm.”62  
4.  Utility Patents for Plants 
The possibility of plants receiving the full protection of a utility patent 
arose with the landmark Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.63 Chakrabarty involved the patent eligibility of a bacteria 
that was genetically modified to be capable of breaking down crude oil.64 
The question before the Supreme Court was “whether a live, human-
made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.”65 The Supreme Court found that the “claim is not to 
a[n] . . . unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity 
‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”66 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court observed that the applicant “ha[d] produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery 
is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable 
subject matter under § 101.”67 The Court held that genetically modified 
bacteria is patent-eligible subject matter, opening the door for the 
possibility of full utility patent protection for plants.68 
In October 2001, the Supreme Court clarified any doubt as to whether 
sexually reproducing plants are patent-eligible subject matter.69 In J.E.M. 
Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., the Supreme Court 
considered whether “utility patents may be issued for plants under 35 
U.S.C. § 101” or if “the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Plant Patent 
Act of 1930 are the exclusive means of obtaining a federal statutory right 
to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant 
varieties.”70 J.E.M. Ag Supply involved the validity of utility patents 
covering the manufacture and use of Pioneer’s inbred and hybrid corn 
seed products.71 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s reliance 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See CHISUM, supra note 31, § 24.03(b)(ii). 
 62. H.R. REP. 103-349, at 11 (1994). 
 63. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 64. Id. at 305. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 309–10 (alteration in original) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 
615 (1887)). 
 67. Id. at 310. 
 68. See id. at 318. 
 69. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001). 
 70. Id. at 127 (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. 
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on Chakrabarty’s broad construction of § 101 and held that the subject 
matter covered by § 101 clearly included plant life.72 The Court observed 
that “advances in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have 
allowed plant breeders to satisfy § 101’s demanding description 
requirement.”73 The Court also noted that “Congress ha[d] not only failed 
to pass legislation indicating that it disagree[d] with the [US]PTO’s 
interpretation of § 101 [that plants are patent-eligible subject matter]; it 
has even recognized the availability of utility patents for plants.”74 
The decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply is where the current state of 
intellectual property protection for plants remains. If a plant meets the 
patent criteria of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness, it can receive the 
full protection of a utility patent.75 A key difference is that the PPA and 
PVPA allow farmers to save their seeds for replanting and do not prohibit 
research.76 A utility patent provides increased protection and gives the 
patent holder the power to exclude others from both saving their seeds 
for replanting and conducting research with the patented plant.77  
II.  THE INTERACTION BETWEEN USPTO GMO POLICY AND FDA GMO 
POLICY 
To analyze how USPTO GMO policy and FDA GMO policy interact, 
this Part begins by defining each agency’s role. It then explains the 
underlying policy goals and the overall functions and responsibilities of 
each agency. An understanding of the purpose of each agency’s actions 
again highlights the deficiency in the existing statutory framework. 
Examples comparing the varying treatment of different food products by 
the USPTO and the FDA illustrate this deficiency.  
A.  Defining the Roles of the USPTO and the FDA 
The USPTO and the FDA each have a separate and distinct role in 
U.S. GMO policy. The underlying policy considerations shed light on the 
unique roles that both the USPTO and the FDA play. Examining the 
overall functions and responsibilities of each agency clarifies the 
agency’s role in GMO policy. The USPTO’s role centers on granting 
patents which provide intellectual property protection. The FDA’s role 
centers on ensuring the safety of the food supply and human health. 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 129. 
 73. Id. at 134. 
 74. Id. at 145. 
 75. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012). 
 76. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (2012). 
 77. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
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1.  The Progress of Science 
The USPTO serves to meet the constitutional mandate “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”78 At a basic level, the USPTO’s impact on GMO policy 
is to “grant patents for the protection of inventions.”79 Granting patents 
meets the constitutional mandate by promoting scientific progress 
“[t]hrough the preservation, classification, and dissemination of patent 
information” and by securing inventors exclusive rights to their 
discoveries for the limited term of the patent.80 The USPTO evaluates 
each patent application under statutory provisions for subject matter 
eligibility as well as utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.81  
The USPTO evaluates subject matter eligibility and utility under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.82 The statutory language provides that “[w]hoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor.”83 GMOs are patent-eligible subject matter under 
the Supreme Court precedent in Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag Supply.84 
Chakrabarty held that a living organism is patentable subject matter,85 
and J.E.M. Ag Supply affirmed that plants, both asexually and sexually 
reproducing, are patent-eligible subject matter for utility patents.86 The 
utility for a GMO comes from the desirable trait incorporated into the 
GMO through genetic modification.87 For example, a plant genetically 
modified to produce its own pesticide is a useful invention because of this 
new ability to repel insects.88 Some possible utilities for GMO food 
products include faster growth rates, increased yields, resistance to pests 
and weeds, and decreased need for water.89  
                                                                                                                     
 78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 79. Functions of the Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/function.htm (last updated Nov. 14, 2015). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. Each patent application is also evaluated for formalities, 
written description, enablement, best mode, and other requirements, however, those are beyond 
the scope of this Note. See MPEP Ch. 700 (9th ed., Mar. 2014) (providing guidance on the USPTO 
procedures for examination of applications). 
 82. See id. § 101. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See supra Subsection I.B.4. 
 85. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). 
 86. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 146 (2001). 
 87. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313. 
 88. See U.S. Patent No. 6,340,593 col. 3 l. 36–40 (filed Oct. 21, 1999) (issued Jan. 22, 2002) 
(exemplifying plant-optimized polynucleotides encoding approximately 15 kDa and 
approximately 45 kDa pesticidal proteins). 
 89. E.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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After evaluating a GMO patent application for subject matter 
eligibility and utility, the USPTO evaluates the claimed invention for 
novelty and nonobviousness.90 Novelty requires that the invention has not 
been “anticipated” by any prior art; in other words, the claimed GMO 
must be new.91 A GMO will pass the novelty requirement unless it can 
be shown that the GMO is not a new invention.92 Additionally, the 
nonobviousness requirement is likely the most challenging requirement a 
GMO faces. The statutory language provides as follows:  
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if 
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have 
been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall 
not be negated by the manner in which the invention was 
made.93 
For a claimed invention of a GMO, the USPTO must determine if it 
would have been obvious to a person skilled in the art to combine the 
elements from the prior art to create the claimed invention.94 A detailed 
analysis of the multiple variations of nonobviousness analysis possible 
for GMOs is beyond the scope of this Note.  
The critical point to observe is that the more unnatural the genetic 
modification combination is, the more likely it is that the combination 
will be found nonobvious. The more likely it is that the combination is 
nonobvious, the more likely it is that the GMO will receive the protection 
of a utility patent. As genetic modification technology becomes 
increasingly common, there will likely be more patent application 
rejections based on “obviousness.” This possibility encourages GMO 
developers to make “less obvious” genetic combinations to obtain patent 
protection. “Less obvious” combinations will likely involve more 
transgenic GMOs and less intragenic GMOs.95 For example, it might be 
obvious to genetically modify a red tomato with genes from a green 
tomato to increase bruising resistance, but it might be “less obvious” to 
                                                                                                                     
 90. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012). 
 91. MPEP § 2131 (9th ed., Mar. 2014) (providing guidance on how to analyze a patent 
application under 35 U.S.C. § 102). 
 92. See id. 
 93. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 94. See MPEP §§ 2141–2144 (providing guidance on how to analyze a patent application 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
 95. Transgenic GMOs involve genetic modifications incorporating genes from different 
species, while intragenic GMOs involve genetic modifications incorporating genes from the same 
species. See generally Marlam Sticklen, Transgenic, Cisgenic, Intragenic and Subgenic Crops, 
ADVANCES CROP SCI. & TECH., Apr. 2015, at 1, http://www.esciencecentral.org/journals/
transgenic-cisgenic-intragenic-and-subgenic-crops-2329-8863-1000e123.pdf. 
13
Roorda: Patents, Hidden Novelty, and Food Safety
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
670 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
modify a red tomato with genes from a grasshopper to increase bruising 
resistance. 
It is important to observe that the USPTO does not evaluate the safety 
of an invention receiving a patent. In the past, moral considerations 
played a role in the evaluation of the utility requirement.96 However, the 
utility requirement’s only modern moral restriction is that the invention 
must be capable of serving a lawful purpose.97 The role of the USPTO in 
GMO policy is simply to promote the progress of science98 by 
determining if the claimed GMO invention meets the statutory criteria to 
receive a patent without considering the safety of the claimed GMO.   
2.  Food Safety and Human Health 
The origins of the FDA can be traced back to the passage of the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act in 1906.99 Today, the FDA derives its authority from 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).100 Essentially, the 
FDA regulates food safety and human health.101 It “protect[s] the public 
health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security of human and 
veterinary drugs, biological products, . . . [and the U.S.] food supply.”102 
Specifically, the “FDA regulates the safety of substances added to 
food . . . [and] how most food is processed, packaged, and labeled.”103  
The FFDCA mandates a premarket approval safety assessment before 
a food enters the U.S. food supply.104 The premarket approval process 
begins with a petition submitted by the applicant.105 The petition must 
contain adequate data to allow the FDA to conduct a chemistry review, a 
toxicology review, and an environmental review prior to the FDA 
approval of the food product.106  However, the FFDCA does not require 
                                                                                                                     
 96. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568), 
abrogation recognized by In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 97. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 99. History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/ (last updated Mar. 23, 2015).  
 100. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 393 (2012).  
 101. See What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/ 
(last updated Dec. 7, 2015). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Ingredients, Packaging & Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/default.htm (last updated June 21, 
2016). 
 104. See 21 C.F.R. § 171.1(h)(4) (2014) (detailing the FFDCA’s safety assessment 
requirements). 
 105.  Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers About the Petition Process, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/ucm253328.htm#answerC (last updated Mar. 23, 2015). 
 106. Id. (providing a basic overview of the petition requirements and process). The applicant-
provided data includes the results from and the methodology of detailed safety studies. Id. 
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a premarket approval safety assessment if the food is classified as 
“generally recognized as safe” (GRAS).107 Once a food substance 
qualifies as GRAS, it may enter directly into the U.S. food supply.108 
In 1992, the FDA issued a policy statement regarding “Foods Derived 
from New Plant Varieties,” which it reiterated in 2001.109 The policy 
states that “transferred genetic material can be presumed to be GRAS.”110 
The FDA also affirmed that it still holds the view that 
there is unlikely to be a safety question sufficient to question 
the presumed GRAS status of proteins (typically enzymes) 
produced from the transferred genetic material, or of 
substances produced by the action of the introduced enzymes 
(such as carbohydrates, fats, and oils), when these proteins 
or other substances do not differ significantly from other 
substances commonly found in food and are already present 
at generally comparable or greater levels in currently 
consumed foods.111  
Consistent with these policies, the FDA typically presumes food derived 
from genetically modified plants to be GRAS and therefore does not 
subject it to premarket approval safety testing.112 
The FDA evaluates food additives under a more stringent safety 
standard than whole foods.113 A food additive is “any substance that is 
not an inherent constituent of food or whose level in food has been 
increased by human intervention to be ‘added.’”114 However, a food 
additive that is considered GRAS is excluded from the more stringent 
safety standard.115 As a result, many food additives derived from natural 
sources are considered GRAS, which allows the food additives to bypass 
FDA review and enter the food supply.116 The manufacturer of a new 
food product, not the FDA, makes the initial determination of whether 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30 (discussing various methods of determining whether a food 
substance qualifies as GRAS); id. §§ 182, 184, 186 (2014) (identifying food substances that have 
been generally recognized as safe). 
 108. See id. §§ 170.30, 182.1, 184.1, 186.1. 
 109. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,989–90 (May 29, 1992).  See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 4706, 4709 (Jan. 18, 2001) (reiterating the 1992 policy from the FDA Policy Statement 
regarding Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties). 
 110. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See 21 C.F.R. § 170.30; FDA Proposed Rule, Premarket Notice Concerning 
Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4709. 
 113. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,988–
89. 
 114. Id. at 22,989. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
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the new food product is GRAS.117  
The FDA also applies different standards of review for genetically 
modified plant food products and genetically modified animal food 
products. As discussed above, genetically modified plant food products 
are evaluated as a food substance and are presumed to be GRAS.118 When 
confronted with the first genetically modified animal food product, the 
FDA determined that the appropriate standard of review was to treat the 
added genetic material as an animal drug, subjecting it to a much more 
extensive safety testing process.119 However, the science and processes 
underlying genetic modification methods, such as recombinant DNA 
techniques or cell fusion techniques, are the same for both genetically 
modified plants and genetically modified animals.120 The FDA stated that 
the reason for the different treatment is that animals can transmit diseases 
to humans, which leads to the increased safety testing requirement.121 
This differential treatment means that a strawberry modified to include 
fish genes could qualify as GRAS, while a fish modified to include 
strawberry genes would be evaluated under the animal drug regulations.  
In addition to selecting a higher standard for safety evaluation of 
genetically modified animals as food products, the FDA approval process 
for the first genetically modified animal food product experienced 
multiple lengthy and unexplained delays.122 AquaBounty first 
approached the FDA seeking approval for AquAdvantage Salmon in 
1995 and did not receive approval until November 2015.123 This is in 
contrast to the first genetically modified plant product, the Flavr Savr 
tomato, which Calgene first mentioned to the FDA in 1991 and which 
was in grocery stores by 1994.124 Perhaps these differences are solely 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 22,990. 
 119. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS 2 
(2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048122.pdf. 
 120. Id. at 1–2. 
 121. Genetically Engineered Animals: General Q&A, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/Gene
ticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm113605.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2015). 
 122. Ron Stotish, AquAdvantage Salmon: A Regulatory Odyssey, BIOTECH NOW (Apr. 24, 
2013), http://www.biotech-now.org/food-and-agriculture/2013/04/aquadvantage-salmon-a-regul 
atory-odyssey. 
 123. Heidi Ledford, Transgenic Salmon Nears Approval: Slow US Regulatory Process 
Highlights Hurdles of Getting Engineered Food Animals to Dinner Tables, 497 NATURE 17, 17 
(2013), http://www.nature.com/news/transgenic-salmon-nears-approval-1.12903; AquAdvantage 
Salmon Approval Letter and Appendix, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/Gene
ticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm466214.htm (last updated Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter 
AquAdvantage Approval Letter]. 
 124. Memorandum from Consumer Safety Officer, Biotechnology Policy Branch on 
Consultation with Calgene, Inc., Concerning FLAVR SAVR Tomatoes to Acting Dir., Office of 
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because of the ability of animals to spread disease to humans, or perhaps 
they are an indicator of the beginning of a shift in policy for the regulation 
of genetically modified foods by the FDA.  
The FDA also has other responsibilities related to food safety and 
human health that are worth noting.125 One of these responsibilities is 
advancing the public health “by helping to speed innovations that make 
medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable.”126 Another 
responsibility is “helping the public get the accurate, science-based 
information . . . to use medicines and foods to maintain and improve their 
health.”127 As a result, the FDA has promoted advances in biotechnology, 
including genetically modified plants.128 
B.  USPTO and FDA Policy Comparisons 
To better understand the GMO policy of the USPTO and the FDA, it 
is helpful to compare the way each agency evaluates various products for 
human consumption. New and naturally occurring food products, 
artificial and non-naturally occurring food products, and pharmaceuticals 
must typically undergo premarket approval safety testing by the FDA 
before entering the U.S. market.129 This is in contrast to genetically 
modified plant food products, which typically bypass the premarket 
approval safety testing and enter directly into the U.S. food supply. As 
discussed above, the USPTO does not consider safety when determining 
whether a product is eligible for a patent. Interestingly, the FDA requires 
genetically modified animal food products to undergo a much more 
rigorous  approval process than their genetically modified plant 
counterparts. The following examples illustrate how these policies 
operate in practice. For each example, assume the manufacturer is 
seeking a utility patent from the USPTO and entry into the U.S. food 
supply through the FDA.  
1.  New and Naturally Occurring 
Consider the treatment of two naturally occurring food products for 
which a company seeks both a patent from the USPTO and approval to 
enter the food supply from the FDA. For the first scenario, consider a 
newly discovered naturally occurring food product found in the wild. For 
the second scenario, consider a naturally occurring food product resulting 
from conventional crossbreeding of plants. 
                                                                                                                     
Premarket Approval (May 17, 1994), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/
Biotechnology/Submissions/ucm225043.htm. 
 125. What We Do, supra note 101. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See 21 C.F.R. § 171.1(h)(4) (2014).  
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First, imagine a team of explorers discovering a new plant in the wild 
that produces yellow berries. The USPTO will determine that the plant 
and its yellow berries are not patentable, as the Supreme Court has held 
that “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the 
wild is not patentable subject matter.”130 The USPTO would not need to 
consider the criteria of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness because the 
discovery of the naturally occurring plant and yellow berries does not 
meet the initial subject matter eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 
101.131 
To receive FDA approval, the yellow berries must undergo premarket 
approval process.132 The premarket approval process mandates a safety 
assessment of the food substance.133 This safety assessment must show 
that the yellow berries are safe for human consumption before the yellow 
berries may enter the food supply.134  
There are two important exemptions to the mandated food safety 
assessment.135 If the naturally occurring food product has a history of 
extensive use in food prior to 1958 or published scientific evidence shows 
the safety of the food product for human consumption, then the food 
product can be considered GRAS.136 A food substance classified as 
GRAS may enter the food supply without premarket approval safety 
testing.137 In this example, neither exemption would apply because the 
newly discovered yellow berries are not substantially equivalent to an 
existing approved food substance. 
Now, imagine a plant breeder uses manual pollination to crossbreed 
two varieties of strawberry plants and the resulting plant has a heritable 
trait that produces sweet purple berries. The USPTO will likely determine 
that the conventionally crossbred sweet purple berries are not utility 
patent eligible because they are still a product of nature, even though 
manual pollination aided nature.138 Unlike the yellow berries newly 
discovered in the wild, the crossbred purple berries would likely be 
                                                                                                                     
 130. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (finding that “a new plant found 
in the wild is not patentable subject matter”). 
 131. See 35 U.S.C. § 101–103 (2012). 
 132. See supra Section II.B. 
 133. See 21 C.F.R. § 171.1(h)(4). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See INT’L FOOD INFO. COUNCIL FOUND. & U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOOD 
INGREDIENTS & COLORS 5 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/IngredientsPackaging
Labeling/ucm094249.pdf. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) (finding that 
no invention existed when several species of bacteria were mixed in a beneficial way). The plant 
could possibly obtain protection through the PVPA, but it would not be eligible for a plant patent 
because it has not been asexually reproduced. See supra Subsections I.B.2–3. 
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exempt from the FDA’s premarket approval safety testing because they 
would likely be substantially equivalent to a typical strawberry and 
therefore classified as GRAS. 
In summary, a naturally occurring food product would not be eligible 
for a patent but would be subjected to the FDA’s premarket approval 
process, which includes safety testing. However, naturally occurring food 
products are classified as GRAS, and therefore bypass the premarket 
approval process, if the naturally occurring food product has a history of 
extensive use in food before 1958 or if published scientific evidence 
supports the safety of the food product.139  
2.  Artificial or Non-naturally Occurring 
Now, consider the treatment of an artificial or non-naturally occurring 
food product for which a company seeks both a patent from the USPTO 
and approval to enter the food market from the FDA. As an example, 
consider the artificial sweetener sucralose.140 Sucralose is used as a zero-
calorie sweetener.141 It is produced by subjecting naturally occurring 
sugar to a chlorination process.142 
The USPTO has granted numerous patents for various forms of 
sucralose.143 Sucralose meets all of the statutory requirements for 
patenting.144 The artificial sweetener satisfies the subject matter 
eligibility requirement.145 The utility requirement146 is met by the zero-
calorie characteristic of the sweetener, which makes it useful to 
individuals who want to reduce their caloric intake and to diabetics who 
are unable to consume natural sugar.147 When sucralose was invented, it 
was new and met the novelty requirement.148 Sucralose also passed the 
last hurdle presented by the nonobviousness requirement. At the time of 
the invention, it would not have been obvious that subjecting sugar to a 
chlorination process would result in a zero-calorie sweetener that is much 
sweeter than the original sugar.149 
                                                                                                                     
 139. INT’L FOOD INFO. COUNCIL FOUND. & U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 135, at 5. 
 140. See U.S. Patent No. 4,801,700 cols. 2 l. 65 to 3 l. 6 (filed Oct. 20, 1986) (issued Jan. 31, 
1989) (describing patent claims for a sucralose process). 
 141. What Is SPLENDA® Brand Sweetener (Sucralose)?, SPLENDA, 
http://www.splenda.com/faq/no-calorie-sweetener (last visited June 25, 2016) [hereinafter What 
Is Splenda]. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See U.S. Patent No. 6,646,121 col. 2 l. 45–48 (filed Nov. 16, 2001) (issued Nov. 11, 
2003) (containing citations to additional granted U.S. patents for various forms of sucralose). 
 144. See id. cols. 3–8 (demonstrating the patentability of sucralose compositions). 
 145. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); MPEP § 2106 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). 
 146. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; MPEP § 2107. 
 147. What Is Splenda, supra note 141. 
 148. See 35 U.S.C. § 102; MPEP § 2131. 
 149. See 35 U.S.C. § 103; MPEP §§ 2141–2144. 
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The FDA classifies sucralose as a food additive.150 During the 
approval process, the FDA reviewed more than 110 safety studies of 
sucralose.151 The FDA notes that Sucralose has been extensively studied 
by others and is approved as a general-purpose sweetener in food under 
certain conditions of use.152 Sucralose was not classified as GRAS 
because it was not substantially equivalent to sugar as indicated by the 
difference in caloric content and other characteristics.153  
In summary, an artificial or non-naturally occurring food product is 
eligible for a patent but is subjected to the FDA’s premarket approval 
process, which includes safety testing. The only exception to the 
premarket approval process is GRAS classification. An artificial or non-
naturally occurring food product is less likely to be considered 
substantially equivalent and therefore less likely to be classified as 
GRAS.  
3.  New and Generic Pharmaceuticals 
Consider the development of a new pharmaceutical. A new 
pharmaceutical typically is granted a utility patent if the pharmaceutical 
meets the criteria of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. A manufacturer 
seeking approval to sell a new pharmaceutical must complete many steps 
to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of the drug.154 Initially, tests 
are conducted in the laboratory and on animals.155 If these tests indicate 
the drug is safe enough to be tested in humans, the manufacturer submits 
an Investigational New Drug Application that the FDA reviews prior to 
the human testing.156 The FDA monitors three phases of human clinical 
trials of the drug.157 Finally, the records from all of the testing are 
submitted in a New Drug Application, which experts at the FDA 
review.158 The FDA only approves the new pharmaceutical if the known 
benefits of its proposed use outweigh the known risks.159  
                                                                                                                     
 150. Food Additives & Ingredients: High-Intensity Sweeteners, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(May 19, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/FoodAdditives
Ingredients/ucm397716.htm. 
 151. Additional Information About High-Intensity Sweeteners Permitted for Use in Food in 
the United States, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/
IngredientsPackagingLabeling/FoodAdditivesIngredients/ucm397725.htm (last updated May 26, 
2015). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See How FDA Evaluates Regulated Products: Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm269834.htm (last updated June 25, 
2016). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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By contrast, a generic pharmaceutical is ineligible for patent 
protection but enjoys an abbreviated FDA approval process.  When a new 
pharmaceutical is developed, it typically has the protection of a utility 
patent.160 Once the patent expires, generic versions of the pharmaceutical 
are made. Patent protection is not available for a generic pharmaceutical 
because the generic will fail the novelty requirement of patent eligibility. 
A generic pharmaceutical by its nature intends to be a copy of the original 
and not a new pharmaceutical.161 The active ingredients must be the same 
in the original and the generic pharmaceuticals; however, the inactive 
ingredients may vary.162 Additionally, to qualify as a generic 
pharmaceutical, the use indications must be the same as the original 
pharmaceutical.163 The FDA only requires an abbreviated new drug 
application for approval to market a generic pharmaceutical.164 The 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturer is not required to conduct the 
animal or clinical research on ingredients or dosage forms required of the 
original pharmaceutical manufacturer because those steps would be 
duplicative and unnecessary.165  
4.  Genetically Modified Plants as Food 
Now consider a plant that has been genetically modified using new 
methods, such as recombinant DNA techniques or cell fusion techniques, 
to include modification that would not be possible with traditional 
breeding methods. For example, a genetically modified plant created 
using recombinant DNA techniques to transfer genetic material from 
certain genes in fish, which encode proteins that increase resistance to 
cold, into an agricultural crop such as strawberries.166 Clearly a fish and 
a strawberry are not sexually compatible and could not be crossbred using 
traditional methods. A strawberry genetically modified by inserting fish 
genetic material would be patent-eligible subject matter under the 
                                                                                                                     
 160. TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT: MAKING 
THE MOST OF EACH AND EVERY BRAND § 8.10 (2012). 
 161. See Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www. 
fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm (last updated 
Jan. 7, 2015).  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. In 1991, the DNA Plant Technology Corporation published a paper describing 
transgenic tomato plants that were modified by inserting a gene from the northern-hemisphere 
winter flounder to produce antifreeze proteins. See Robin Hightower et al., Expression of 
Antifreeze Proteins in Transgenic Plants, 17 PLANT MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1013, 1013 (1991). 
The transgenic tomatoes never made it to the marketplace after further research was unsuccessful 
in developing a cold-resistant tomato. Peggy G. Lemaux, Genetically Engineered Plants and 
Foods: A Scientist’s Analysis of the Issues (Part I), 59 ANN. REV. PLANT BIOLOGY 771, 777, 779 
(2008). 
21
Roorda: Patents, Hidden Novelty, and Food Safety
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
678 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
reasoning from Chakrabarty, which found that the genetic alteration by 
man was sufficient to overcome the restriction on patenting products of 
nature.167 The new strawberry’s increased resistance to cold is sufficient 
to meet the utility requirement.168 The USPTO will grant a utility patent 
as long as the requirements of patentability, including novelty and 
nonobviousness, are met.169 
The FDA has stated a presumption of GRAS status for foods derived 
from genetically modified plants.170 As long as the new strawberry does 
not contain an increased level of a naturally occurring toxicant or a new 
unexpected toxicant and as long as it has a similar nutritional profile to a 
typical strawberry, the manufacturer is likely to determine that the new 
strawberry is GRAS.171 No weight is given to the fact that it would be 
impossible to traditionally crossbreed a strawberry with a fish.172 Once 
the new strawberry is determined to be GRAS, it bypasses the FDA 
review process and can enter the food supply.173 
In summary, a food product derived from a genetically modified plant 
will likely obtain a utility patent, and the manufacturer will likely classify 
it as GRAS. The GRAS status allows the food product to bypass the FDA 
review process. The FDA states that it “has rarely had occasion to review 
the GRAS status of foods derived from new plant varieties because these 
foods have been widely recognized and accepted as safe.”174  
5.  Genetically Modified Animals as Food 
Now consider an animal that has been genetically modified using new 
methods, such as recombinant DNA techniques or cell fusion techniques, 
to include modification that would not be possible with traditional 
breeding methods. For this example, consider AquAdvantage Salmon, 
the first genetically modified animal for which a manufacturer has sought 
FDA approval.175 AquAdvantage Salmon has genetic modifications that 
cause an Atlantic salmon to produce its growth hormone year-round 
rather than producing the growth hormone only during a short period each 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). 
 168. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 169. See id. §§ 102–103. 
 170. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,989–90 (May 29, 1992). 
 171. See id. at 22,987, 22,990. 
 172. See id. at 22,990. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. An Overview of Atlantic Salmon, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicineAd
visoryCommittee/ucm222635.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2015). 
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year.176 The result is AquAdvantage Salmon, which has the potential to 
grow to maturity in half the time as a naturally occurring Atlantic 
salmon.177 Just as a genetically modified plant is eligible for a utility 
patent, a genetically modified animal is eligible for a utility patent.178  
The FDA evaluates food derived from genetically modified animals 
differently than it evaluates food derived from genetically modified 
plants.179 Genetically modified animals and food products derived from 
them are evaluated under a New Animal Drug Application (NADA).180 
Essentially, the inserted genetic material is treated as an “animal drug” 
for the animal being genetically modified.181 This evaluation process 
requires a much more extensive safety review by the FDA.182 If approved 
under a NADA, a post-market surveillance program is put in place to 
monitor for any unforeseen safety issues that arise.183  
On November 19, 2015, the FDA announced the approval for 
AquAdvantage Salmon.184 The FDA approval is subject to conditions of 
use which include specific manufacturing methods, facilities, and 
controls. Only two facilities, neither of which are located in United States, 
are approved to produce, raise, and harvest AquAdvantage Salmon.185 
The approval provides detailed specifications for physical containment, 
breeding procedures, testing requirements, and shipment logistics.186 
Additionally, the approval contains recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements which mandate the documentation of adverse events along 
with product and manufacturing defects, and require detailed periodic 
drug experience reports and special drug experience reports.187    
In summary, a genetically modified animal as a food product is 
capable of receiving utility patent protection but is subject to a much more 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Frequently Asked Questions, AQUABOUNTY TECHS., http://aquabounty.com/press-
room/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited June 25, 2016). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Transgenic Mice Expressing Human Insulin, U.S. Patent No. 6,018,097, at [57] 
(filed Apr. 11, 1995) (issued Jan. 25, 2000).  
 179. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR VETERINARY MED., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS CONTAINING HERITABLE RECOMBINANT 
DNA CONSTRUCTS 10–11 (2011), http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/Guidance
ComplianceEnforcement/Guidancefor Industry/default.htm. 
 180. Id. at 6. 
 181 . See Genetically Engineered Animals: General Q&A, supra note 121.  
 182. See id.  
 183. Id. 
 184. See Genetically Engineered Animals: AquAdvantage Salmon, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineer 
ing/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/ucm280853.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 2016) (stating the 
current status of the FDA approval process for AquAdvantage Salmon). 
 185. AquAdvantage Approval Letter, supra note 123.  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
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extensive review by the FDA than a food derived from a genetically 
modified plant.188 The review under NADA requires safety testing and a 
post-market surveillance program to evaluate the safety of a food derived 
from a genetically modified animal.189 As demonstrated by the nearly two 
decade approval process and the detailed post-market conditions of use 
required for AquAdvantage Salmon, the FDA is clearly treating 
genetically modified animal food products differently from their 
genetically modified plant food product counterparts. 
These examples illustrate the unique roles of the USPTO and FDA in 
GMO policy.  The USPTO grants patent protection for novel inventions, 
such as GMOs, to promote scientific progress.  The FDA protects human 
health through food safety regulations, which include the approval of 
food products entering the U.S. food supply.  However, the FDA does not 
consider the impact of utility patent protection on a food product’s 
availability for independent food safety testing.   
III.  THE LACK OF INDEPENDENT FOOD SAFETY TESTING 
FDA GMO policy, in combination with GMO manufacturer licensing 
restrictions, makes it very difficult to identify the end products containing 
specific genetically modified food products and nearly impossible to 
isolate a specific genetically modified food product for safety testing. 
This combination results in an effective block to independent food safety 
testing. This has created a special “hidden novelty” exception where the 
non-naturally occurring component of a manufactured food product not 
only makes the food product eligible for a utility patent but also results 
in the lack of access for independent food safety testing for which food 
products are otherwise available. Manufacturers use the protective power 
of the utility patent through license agreements to prevent any 
independent testing or safety research of the patented GMO.  
A.  The Special “Hidden Novelty” Exception 
Many criticisms of the FDA’s regulation of GMOs exist.190 While 
critics have made many valid points, this Note limits its focus to the 
critical absence of independent food safety testing for GMOs protected 
by utility patents. One factor the FDA does not consider in its guidance 
for evaluating food safety is the accessibility of the food product for 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See Genetically Engineered Animals: General Q&A, supra note 121.  
 189. See id. 
 190. See, e.g., Maria R. Lee-Muramoto, Reforming the "Uncoordinated" Framework for 
Regulation of Biotechnology, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 311, 313 (2012) (criticizing the regulation of 
GMOs); Mandel, supra note 15, at 2233 (same); see also Angelo, supra note 8, at 95–98 
(proposing a new evolutionary biology model for regulating GMOs). 
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independent food safety research.191 The current regulatory framework 
instead allows the manufacturer to determine the appropriate level of 
review for the food product that it seeks approval for based upon guidance 
issued by the FDA.192 By ignoring the implications of utility patent 
protection, the FDA’s current regulatory framework effectively removes 
the ability for most genetically modified foods to be independently tested 
for safety.  
The missing food safety protection of independent safety testing is 
brought to light by considering the implications and interactions of the 
protection a utility patent provides a food product and the ability to 
identify the food product in the marketplace. In most instances, it is legal 
to conduct independent research and testing on a food product.193 
Independent testing is permissible in four general situations. First, it is 
permissible where a food product lacks utility patent protection.  In this 
case, a manufacturer is unable to use the exclusion power of a utility 
patent to prevent an independent researcher from making, using, or 
testing the food product.194 Second, it is permissible where a legal 
exemption for research exists. In this case, an independent researcher is 
able to conduct testing on a food product even if the testing would 
otherwise be prohibited.195 Third, it is permissible where a food product 
is easily identifiable in the marketplace. For example, where a food 
product is either available as a whole food or clearly labeled, an 
independent researcher is able to identify and purchase the food product 
in the marketplace and conduct testing on the specific food product. 
Fourth, it is permissible where a food product is sold rather than licensed. 
In this case, an independent researcher is able to purchase and use the 
food product free of restrictions which allows for independent testing.196  
However, when none of these situations exist, a food product is not 
available for independent testing. A utility patent granted to a food 
product provides the right to exclude others, does not provide a legal 
research exemption, and allows for the food product to be licensed rather 
than sold. When a utility patent protected food product is incorporated 
into a processed food product with multiple ingredients, in varying ratios, 
and without labeling, it is not easily identifiable in the marketplace. As a 
result, a utility patent protected food product is able to effectively “hide” 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,990 (May 29, 1992). 
 192. Id. at 22,989–91. 
 193. See, e.g., Carey Gillam, Fears over Roundup Herbicide Residues Prompt Private 
Testing, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-food-agriculture-glyphosate-
idUSKBN0N029H20150409. 
 194. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). 
 195. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2012) (stating the research exemption provided in the Plant 
Variety Protection Act).  
 196. See infra Section III.B (discussing the power of patent licensing). 
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from independent safety testing. 
The FDA’s blindness to the implications of utility patent protection 
creates what this Note calls a “hidden novelty” exception. The “novel” 
feature of a food product results in utility patent protection. This novel 
feature is “hidden” from the FDA guidance and evaluation process. The 
FDA does not “see” a difference between the patented food product and 
its naturally occurring counterpart. The resulting “exception” allows the 
manufacturer to use the utility patent protection, through licensing 
restrictions, to prevent any independent food safety research while 
complying with FDA guidance and bypassing the premarket approval 
safety assessment. Therefore, the “hidden novelty” exception allows the 
manufacturer to use the novelty of its invention to maintain full control 
over any food safety testing of its patented product.  
The narrowness of this special “hidden novelty” exception is 
exemplified by the previous examples comparing USPTO and FDA 
policy for various food product categories.197 Naturally occurring food 
products will not have utility patent protection.198 Additionally, if the 
PVPA protects a naturally occurring food product, there is a legal 
exemption specifically for independent research activities.199 Non-
naturally occurring food products, such as sucralose, typically have utility 
patent protection.200 However, the product will be easily identifiable 
through food labeling in the marketplace, and the product is sold rather 
than licensed, making it available for independent testing.  Utility patent-
protected pharmaceuticals, which are subject to extensive testing 
requirements by the FDA,201 are easily identified by labeling in the 
marketplace. 
GMO manufacturers use the protection of a utility patent, including 
licensing,202 combined with a lack of food labeling to identify the 
genetically modified products in the marketplace to prevent access to 
GMO food products for independent research. The narrow “hidden 
novelty” exception applies to GMOs. The utility patent gives the patent 
owner the right to exclude others from using or testing, including safety 
testing, the patented product. No legal exemption permits independent 
research for any reason. The lack of food labeling and the mixing of GMO 
food products in the food supply make it nearly impossible to identify a 
specific GMO food product in the marketplace. GMO manufacturers only 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See supra Section II.B. 
 198. See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
 199. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2012). 
 200. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
 201. See supra Subsection II.B.3. 
 202. See infra Section III.B (explaining how a utility patent is used to block the ability of 
independent research on GMOs). 
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license the food producing organism to growers for commercial crops.203 
The effect of this special “hidden novelty” exception from 
independent testing grows when a GMO food product is classified as 
GRAS. A manufacturer’s initial determination that its genetically 
modified plant food product is GRAS causes a three-fold effect. First, the 
food product can enter the food supply without going through the FDA’s 
premarket review process. Second, the FDA is unlikely to challenge the 
manufacturer’s GRAS determination because of the GRAS presumption. 
Third, the manufacturer can prevent any independent testing through its 
utility patent protection. The only safety testing that occurs is any testing 
the manufacturer grants permission for or voluntarily chooses to 
undertake. 
B.  The Power of Patent Licensing 
The power of utility patent protection, combined with the licensing 
agreements used by patent owners of genetically modified plant 
technology, has granted a monopoly not only over the patented 
technology but also over the research and testing of the raw ingredients 
in the U.S. food supply.204 The license agreement, often called a 
“stewardship agreement,” requires the farmer to agree to several 
restrictions including: (1) to only use the seed products for a single 
commercial crop, (2) to not allow another person or entity to have any 
seed products for any purpose, (3) to not save any grain produced from 
seed products for planting by anyone, and (4) to not use or allow others 
to use the seed products, the grain produced, the licensed technologies, 
or any plant material containing the licensed technologies for crop 
breeding, research (including for testing or generating data to compare 
against similar non-licensed technologies), or seed production unless the 
patent owner has expressly authorized the activity through a written 
agreement.205  
In 2013, the Supreme Court held in Bowman v. Monsanto206 that the 
replanting of a patented seed without the patent holder’s permission 
constitutes patent infringement because the new plant replicates the 
patented invention.207 This holding affirmed the patent owner’s right 
                                                                                                                     
 203. See infra Section III.B. 
 204. See Rowe, supra note 11, at 882–87 (identifying the overreach of patent protection and 
discussing the implications of that overreach). 
 205. See, e.g., SYNGENTA SEEDS, INC., STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT (June 5, 2013), 
http://www3.syngenta.com/country/us/en/agriculture/Stewardship/Documents/SyngentaSteward
shipAgreement.pdf. 
 206. 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).  
 207. Id. at 1769. In Bowman, the Court noted that its holding was limited to a person taking 
an active step to make replicas of a patented product and not applicable to a case where the self-
replication occurred outside the control of a person. Id. 
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prevent seed replanting but did not address the license’s research 
restriction.208 The Court has not had the opportunity to address the 
validity of the license provision prohibiting independent research.209 
A license restriction that directly prohibits independent testing 
combined with a commercial crop limitation make it incredibly difficult, 
if not impossible, to use end food products for independent research. The 
commercial crop limitation results in genetically modified plant products 
mixing in with other crop strains at a grain mill before being sold for use 
in food products.210 The FDA does not require labeling of food containing 
genetically modified plant products, adding to the difficulty of identifying 
the end food products containing a specific genetically modified plant 
product.211 Genetically modified plant products are typically found in 
processed products containing multiple ingredients, making it practically 
impossible to identify and isolate a specific genetically modified food 
product to conduct reliable and high-quality independent research.212 
The additional monopoly of the patent owner controlling the 
independent research of genetically modified plant products raises 
serious concerns. This monopoly, coupled with the difficulty of 
identifying genetically modified plant products in end food products, 
creates a tort liability issue.213 Without the ability to identify which 
products contain a genetically modified plant product, an injured party 
would face an immense challenge in establishing causation for any injury 
attributed to genetically modified plant products.214 Exploration of the 
tort liability issues is beyond the scope of this Note, but others have 
discussed it.215 
                                                                                                                     
 208. See id. 
 209. Rowe, supra note 1130, at 872–74. 
 210. See Van Tassel, supra note 10, 1662. 
 211. Id. at 1655.  
 212. See id. at 1662. 
 213. See Van Tassel, supra note 10, at 1645–48.  Some simplified examples of the types of 
injuries that could result are health-related injuries, such as allergic reactions or the development 
of cancer.  Id.  
 214. The injured party likely has no way of knowing how much or even if he ever consumed 
a specific GMO. The challenge of establishing causation increases for latent injuries such as 
cancer. See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1446–47 (2004). The longer an injury takes to develop, the longer the victim 
is exposed to other possible causes. See id. 
 215. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 9, at 53–60 (warning against inappropriate legal action and 
overregulation of new technology); Van Tassel, supra note 10, at 1646–47 (identifying and 
proposing a solution to a tort immunity problem); see also David G. Owen, Bending Nature, 
Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 569, 572–73 (2010) (discussing the foreseeability of unexpected 
harmful consequences as science and technology rapidly advance).  
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IV.  THE REQUIREMENT OF ACCESS 
It is critical that the components of the U.S. food supply be accessible 
for independent safety testing. Discoveries that appear harmless and seem 
to be perfect solutions can in fact turn out to have dire consequences. It 
can take years before the harmful effects are fully realized or detectable. 
These latent and difficult-to-detect effects are why independent research 
is needed. Reliance on manufacturers to investigate and detect possible 
harmful effects of a food product for the length of a patent term is 
inefficient and not in the public interest. An access requirement for food 
safety testing on all food products and raw ingredients in the U.S. food 
supply is the best solution. It enables independent research while keeping 
patent law precedent intact and intrusion on a utility patent owner’s 
intellectual property rights to a minimum.  
A.  Trans Fat Historical Lesson 
Learning from past experiences can help avoid future mistakes. The 
new technological advances of genetic modification have the immense 
potential to be incredibly beneficial to society. Genetically modified food 
products promise higher crop yields and a more nutritious food supply to 
feed the world’s ever-growing population—two advancements critical in 
the fight to end world hunger. The development of a product with such 
promise should be encouraged and supported. However, access for 
independent research must also be permitted as an added check on the 
safety of the food supply.  
The United States has experience with a promising product that 
seemed to be the perfect solution to many problems but later proved very 
dangerous to human health. Trans fat was the first man-made fat included 
in the U.S. food supply.216 The most common source of trans fat is 
partially hydrogenated vegetable oil.217 Trans fat first entered the U.S. 
food supply in 1911 when Procter & Gamble introduced Crisco.218 Trans 
fat became particularly important by the 1980s, when it was well 
established that saturated fats were unhealthy.219 In response to consumer 
advocacy groups, food manufacturers and many fast-food restaurants 
switched from using saturated fats to using partially hydrogenated oils.220 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See David Schleifer, The Perfect Solution: How Trans Fats Became the Healthy 
Replacement for Saturated Fats, 53 TECH. & CULTURE 94, 100–01 (2012). 
 217. Id. at 94. 
 218. See id. at 100. 
 219. See id. at 109. 
 220. See id. at 109–15. 
29
Roorda: Patents, Hidden Novelty, and Food Safety
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
686 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
The FDA considered partially hydrogenated oil GRAS because it had a 
history of extensive use in food prior to 1958 with no known problems.221   
Partially hydrogenated vegetable oil has many beneficial 
characteristics that produce desirable traits in food products.222 For 
example, adding hydrogen atoms to an oil molecule increases the stability 
and solid characteristic of the oil.223 The result is an oil that creates 
consistent texture, tenderness, and aeration in baked goods.224 The oil 
also gives products a longer shelf life before the oil turns rancid.225 The 
oil can be formulated to be a solid at room temperature, such as in a cake 
frosting to ensure the frosting adheres to the cake and yet literally melts 
in the consumer’s mouth.226 The oil has a higher smoke point than natural 
fats and oils, so when used as fryer oil, it reduces both smoke and the 
frequency that the fryer oil needs to be changed.227 Additionally, the oil 
can be customized for many different uses, does not have a strong taste 
that affects flavor, and is kosher.228 Partially hydrogenated vegetable oil 
seemed to be the perfect solution to common cooking problems in many 
ways.229 
Trans fat was very useful in producing a wide variety of food products 
with desirable characteristics, but it was unclear what health effects trans 
fat would have over time. Independent research conducted in the 1990s, 
however, revealed a correlation between trans fat consumption and 
increased risk for heart disease.230 In 2006, the FDA began requiring food 
labels to list the amount of trans fat in the product.231 Previously, a 
consumer had to read the ingredient list in search of partially 
hydrogenated oil to determine if a food product contained any trans fat. 
The food industry responded by significantly reducing the use of partially 
hydrogenated oils in food products.232 In November 2013, the FDA 
announced that it had “made a preliminary determination that partially 
hydrogenated oils . . . are no longer . . . GRAS.”233 The Center for 
Disease Control estimated that eliminating partially hydrogenated oils 
                                                                                                                     
 221. See Dan Charles, FDA Moves to Phase out Remaining Trans Fats in Food Supply, NPR: 
THE SALT (Nov. 7, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/11/07/243730263/fda-
moves-to-phase-out-remaining-trans-fats-in-food-supply. 
 222. See id.; Schleifer, supra note 216, at 105–06. 
 223. Charles, supra note 221. 
 224. Schleifer, supra note 216, at 105. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. at 105–06. 
 227. Id. at 106. 
 228. Id. at 105–06. 
 229. Id. at 99. 
 230. See Charles, supra note 221. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, FDA FACTS: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS REGARDING TRANS 
FATS 1 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/PopularTopics/UCM385846.pdf. 
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 11
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss2/11
2016] PATENTS, HIDDEN NOVELTY, AND FOOD SAFETY 687 
 
“could prevent 10,000–20,000 heart attacks and 3,000–7,000 coronary 
heart disease deaths each year” in the United States.234 In June 2015, the 
FDA made a final determination that partially hydrogenated oils are not 
GRAS and provided a three-year compliance period for manufacturers to 
eliminate the use of partially hydrogenated oils.235 
Trans fat has many beneficial and wonderful characteristics for a chef 
working in a kitchen; however, what seemed to be the “perfect solution” 
in many ways was actually more harmful than the animal fats and oils it 
replaced.236 The harmful effects of trans fat took decades to realize and 
may never have been identified without independent researchers. Even 
after researchers discovered the drawbacks of trans fat, it still took 
approximately another decade, the FDA requiring the addition of details 
on trans fat to food labels, and public awareness of trans fat health risks 
for the food manufacturers to significantly reduce their use of partially 
hydrogenated oil. More than eight years later, the FDA finally determined 
partially hydrogenated oil is not GRAS for any use in human food. 
The independent researchers studying the effects of trans fat had the 
advantage of expired patents coupled with food labels listing the 
ingredient of partially hydrogenated oil. Consumers had the advantage of 
being able to avoid consuming partially hydrogenated oil by reading food 
labels if they had any concerns or uncertainty about its safety. The history 
of trans fat shows how it can take years to detect the harmful effects of a 
seemingly perfect food product. 
Independent researchers face a much different scenario in conducting 
research on GMOs. Without the permission of the patent owner, 
researchers must wait until the patent term expires to begin any research 
on a food product in the U.S. food supply, creating up to a two-decade 
delay.237 Technology is evolving rapidly, and newly patented GMOs will 
replace the older GMOs as they become available for research.238 Any 
harmful effects from consumption of GMOs will likely be latent effects 
that take a long time to detect and identify.239 The current utility patent 
protection and licensing agreements used by GMO manufacturers forces 
                                                                                                                     
 234. U.S. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TRANS FAT: THE FACTS 1 http://www.cdc.gov/
nutrition/downloads/trans_fat_final.pdf. 
 235. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA CUTS TRANS FAT IN PROCESSED FOOD 1 (2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm372915.htm. 
 236. Trans fats were found to be more harmful than saturated fat because trans fat 
simultaneously increased the bad cholesterol and lowered the good cholesterol, whereas saturated 
fat only increased the bad cholesterol. See id. at 2. 
 237. See 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (2012) (defining the patent term as twenty years). 
 238. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSANTO NEWSROOM, http://www.mon 
santo.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx (last visited June 25, 2016). 
 239. The manufacturer will likely detect any immediate harmful effects, such as the 
production of a toxin, during development. 
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a nearly twenty-year delay on independent research on food products that 
make up raw ingredients in the U.S. food supply. 
B.  Patent Law Policy 
Plants should remain patent-eligible subject matter for utility patents. 
There is a strong line of support from Supreme Court decisions for the 
utility patent eligibility of plants, beginning with Chakrabarty in 1980, 
followed by J.E.M. Ag Supply in 2001, and most recently with Bowman 
in 2013. There is no need to disturb this line of precedent in addressing 
the issue of access to GMOs for independent research. History clearly 
demonstrates that GMOs deserve utility patent protection because they 
can meet the stringent requirements of utility patent eligibility. An 
entirely new and important use is incorporated into an existing food 
source. Rather than completely removing the protection of a utility patent, 
it is possible to enable access through other means such as a research 
exemption for independent food safety research.  
A utility patent subject to a research exemption would still provide 
more protection to the patent owner than a PVP certificate issued under 
the PVPA. This proposal parallels the Court’s reasoning in J.E.M. Ag 
Supply that “[b]ecause it is harder to qualify for a utility patent than for a 
Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, it only makes sense that utility 
patents would confer a greater scope of protection.”240 The PVPA 
contains exemptions for saving seed and for research.241 A utility patent 
subject to a research exemption would still provide the additional 
protection of prohibiting the saving of seed. This protection provides a 
significant financial incentive for the patent owner that is not available 
under the PVPA. The utility patent owner profits from the sale of the seed 
to each grower for every crop year rather than profiting only from the 
initial sale of seed to a grower, who then saves enough seed to replant 
crops the following year.  
Access to GMOs for independent research can be achieved without 
disturbing the patent eligibility of GMOs. An access requirement for 
independent food safety research could be legislated or judicially created 
for patented food products. An access requirement would provide a great 
public benefit by providing an additional safety check for the U.S. food 
supply, and a utility patent would still provide more protection than a 
PVP certificate. The FDA is the ideal agency to implement an access 
requirement for independent food safety research.  
                                                                                                                     
 240. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138 (2001). 
 241. Id. at 140. 
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C.  FDA Policy  
The FDA should require any food product in the U.S. food supply to 
be available for independent food safety research. Allowing independent 
research on products in the U.S. food supply benefits public safety and 
does not significantly harm the intellectual property interests of the patent 
owners.  FDA policy should create an access requirement for independent 
food safety research. The FDA must consider the implications of utility 
patent protection on the ability to conduct independent research on a food 
product. 
At a minimum, the FDA could require access to a patented food 
product for independent food safety research in order for a food to qualify 
for GRAS status. By prohibiting GRAS status, the food product would 
then be subject to the premarket approval safety testing. While this would 
not create access for independent safety research, it would at least require 
the manufacturer to do significant additional testing before the food 
product could enter the food market. It is also possible that the 
manufacturer would voluntarily choose to make its product available for 
independent safety research to obtain GRAS status—perhaps through a 
limited use license allowing independent safety research that prohibits 
competitive research—to avoid the added time and expense of the 
premarket approval safety testing. 
However, even if GMOs were subject to the FDA’s premarket 
approval process, the patent owner can still block independent food safety 
research. The public is left to rely solely on the FDA for safety testing of 
the food product, and the FDA in turn relies on the manufacturer for 
safety testing. A manufacturer’s concern for financial gain could be 
greater than its concern for food safety. A utility patent protecting the use 
of a food as a pesticide or herbicide should not make it illegal to test the 
food independently for safety. 
The FDA should require any food product in the United States to be 
available for independent food safety research. In exchange for the 
benefit of the ability to sell the patented product or the food derived from 
it in the U.S. food market, the FDA should require a manufacturer to 
allow access to the patented product for independent food safety research. 
The FDA would not violate the patent owner’s rights because the patent 
owner is free to choose not to participate in the U.S. food market. 
Implementation of an access requirement is a realistic solution that would 
allow independent researchers to access GMOs for safety testing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is imperative that independent researchers have access to GMOs for 
food safety research. GMOs are an immensely promising technology with 
many possible benefits for not only the United States but also for the 
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world’s food supply. However, the current combination of utility patent 
protection, licensing agreements, and the extreme difficulty in identifying 
a specific genetically modified ingredient in an end product has created a 
special “hidden novelty” exception for food products. This exception 
results in patent protected food products being unavailable for 
independent food safety testing. Ironically, the characteristics of a 
genetically modified food product must be different enough from the 
naturally occurring form of the food productto meet the stringent 
requirements of a utility patent, but the utility patent provides the power 
to prevent any independent testing of such a novel food product because 
the food product is considered GRAS. 
The special “hidden novelty” exception that prevents access to GMOs 
for independent testing shouldbe corrected. This exception creates a 
problematic and lengthy delay in the ability to conduct independent 
research on raw ingredients in the U.S. food supply. It places the control 
of safety testing solely in the hands of the manufacturer of the GMO for 
nearly two decades. Correction is easily accomplished with an access 
requirement for any food product in the U.S. food supply. The patent 
owner would still retain significantly more protection than through the 
PVPA by being able to prevent any seed replanting by farmers, Supreme 
Court precedent would remain intact, and GMOs would be available for 
independent research just like other products in the food supply. 
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